In Cruzan, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect an individual’s deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water. However, where a patient’s wishes are not clear and convincing, a court will be reluctant to order cessation of treatment. In a 6-0 decision, the California Supreme Court ruled that a patient’s tube feedings could not be discontinued under the circumstances of the Wendland case.8 Robert Wendland regained consciousness after 14 months in a coma, but was left hemiparetic and incontinent, and could not feed by mouth or dress, bathe, and communicate consistently. His wife, Rose, refused to authorize reinsertion of his dislodged feeding tube, believing that Robert would not have wanted it replaced. The patient’s daughter and brother, as well as the hospital’s ethics committee, the county ombudsman, and a court-appointed counsel all agreed with the decision. Robert did not have an advance directive, but had made statements to the effect he would not want to live in a vegetative state. But the patient’s mother, Florence, went to court to block the action. The court determined that Robert’s statements were not clear and convincing because they did not address his current condition, were not sufficiently specific, and were not necessarily intended to direct his medical care. Further, the patient’s spouse had failed to provide sufficient evidence that her decision was in her husband’s best interests.
In some jurisdictions, a patient’s advance medical directive to discontinue ANH may require a specific opt-in or opt-out choice. And although medical directives typically spring into effect when a patient is terminally ill, many jurisdictions allow their applicability in nonterminal conditions such as irreversible unconscious states or where the likely risks and burdens of treatment would outweigh any expected benefits (Hawaii is such a state under HRS §327E-16). Physicians are legally bound to respect a patient’s wish regarding forgoing or continuing therapy including ANH. Given the wide variations in legal requirements governing this emotional matter, physicians must look closely at their individual state statute to determine the proper course of action under the circumstances.
References
1. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1976).
2. Code of Medical Ethics of the AMA, 2014-5 ed., section 2.035.
3. Code of Medical Ethics of the AMA, 2014-5 ed., section 2.20.
4. Danis M. Stopping artificial nutrition and hydration at the end of life. UpToDate, Nov 2, 2015.
5. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
6. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) A.C. 789.
7. Available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terri_Schiavo_case.
8. Wendland v. Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal., 2001).
Dr. Tan is emeritus professor of medicine and former adjunct professor of law at the University of Hawaii, and currently directs the St. Francis International Center for Healthcare Ethics in Honolulu. This article is meant to be educational and does not constitute medical, ethical, or legal advice. Some of the articles in this series are adapted from the author’s 2006 book, “Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Law, Managing the Risk,” and his 2012 Halsbury treatise, “Medical Negligence and Professional Misconduct.” For additional information, readers may contact the author at siang@hawaii.edu.